The role of prior experience, intellectual property protection and communication on trust and performance in innovation alliances by Ruitenburg, R. et al.
Journal on Chain and Network Science 2014; 14(2): 117-128 
Wageningen Academic 
P u b l i s h e r s
ISSN 1569-1829 print, ISSN 1875-0931 online, DOI 10.3920/JCNS2014.x006 117
1. Introduction
Innovation can be defined as ‘the implementation of a 
new or significantly improved product (good or service), 
process, marketing or organizational method …’ (OECD 
and EUROSTAT, 2005). Although this definition is very 
general and broad, it is clear that innovation is about 
improvement of the current situation by applying novel 
knowledge in novel ways. Novel knowledge often results 
from the interaction between actors (being people or 
companies or even countries) that differ largely from one 
another and do (therefore) not often interact with one 
another, e.g. Granovetters concept of weak ties (1973, 
1983). In contrast to earlier research, which ascribe the 
practice of technological innovation to a corporate R&D 
lab embedded in a vertically integrated commercialization 
infrastructure (e.g. Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997), the 
concept of Open Innovation, introduced by Chessbrough 
(2003) postulates that firms can and should use external 
as well as internal ideas, knowledge and technology if 
they want to be successful in innovation. Chessbrough 
and Rosenbloom (2002) emphasize that a prerequisite 
for successful commercialization of innovations, whether 
ranging from internal or external sources, is that these need 
to be aligned to the firms strategy and business model (cf. 
Fortuin, 2007; Zott, et al., 2011).
There are different ways in which firms access the knowledge 
and technology needed to complement their own internal 
resources available for innovations. Where some companies 
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look for technology sourcing and acquisition (Arora et al., 
2001; Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003), others will go for 
strategic alliances with external suppliers of technology 
(Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999), or prefer a collaborative 
R&D joint venture (Peck, 1986). Next to these more linear 
inbound and outbound modes of open innovation, Enkel 
et al. (2009) conceptualize the two-way interaction between 
firms and innovative actors outside the firm as the coupled 
mode of open innovation. The present paper focusses on 
the latter form of open innovation. In the review paper on 
open innovation, West and Bogers (2013) conclude that 
although the value creation potential of open innovation 
is consistently established in many studies, more research is 
needed on how value from such sources is captured.
The great challenge of this open innovation paradigm 
is how to retain value for one’s company. How can one 
make sure that knowledge (or at least: its commercially 
applicable outcomes related to one’s own business) remains 
exclusively one’s own property – and thus valuable? How 
do companies protect knowledge so that they can enjoy 
the fruits of their own research (Omta and Van Rossum, 
1999)? The opener one is, the larger the amount of new 
knowledge that can be accessed from others, but also the 
larger the chance that other firms will benefit from one's 
private research investments. A balance has to be found, and 
in the background lies the permanent pitfall for innovation: 
that firms lock themselves up in their R&D-laboratories and 
do not share ideas and licenses that may be valuable to 
others and hence to the economy at large.
Formal intellectual property (IP) rights, confidentiality 
agreements and other kinds of institutional arrangements 
to prevent knowledge being stolen by other firms, may offer 
a solution here. But these arrangements are often expensive 
in terms of time, knowledge and money, and vulnerable 
for power differences in negotiations (Ozmel et al., 2013), 
which may make them especially difficult to apply for 
small and medium sized firms (SMEs). Furthermore, every 
arrangement has its specific characteristics that make it 
more or less suitable for different situations (Denolf, 2010). 
For example recipes cannot be protected by patents, but 
are very valuable for many producers of consumer goods 
in the agrifood sector. Another example is that patents 
are published in an open database, and can thus reveal 
important information about a company’s strategic R&D 
choices to competitors. Finally, these arrangements may 
turn out to put a lag upon innovation, as they are rigid and 
hence hinder creativity and flexibility, which is especially 
important in the case of innovation, which is per definition 
an uncertain process (Tepić et al., 2014).
A solution to this tension might be found in building (in 
case of a new alliance partner), or maintaining (during the 
alliance trajectory and in case of prior experience with a 
partner) trust that one's partner(s) will not abuse one's 
vulnerability when one is open with one's information. 
In this way, trust may substitute or compliment IP 
arrangements (Barney and Hansen, 1994). However, just 
knowing the role of trust is not enough, because trust is not 
a static concept, being either present or absent in a certain 
relationship. It is a dynamic concept: trust can be present 
in different levels, and the level of trust in a relationship 
may increase or decrease over time. Hence it is important 
to improve our understanding of the way in which trust 
develops. Once the factors leading to higher levels of trust 
are better understood, they can be used to advice managers 
how to foster trust in the uncertain world of innovation 
alliances.
The present study aims to improve our insight in the 
role of the interplay of past experience, IP protection 
and communication on trust and on the performance of 
innovation alliances. A survey questionnaire was combined 
with semi-structured interviews with the managers of 5 
companies and of 5 commercial research organizations that 
are centrally involved in one or more innovation alliances. 
Questions were asked about possible previous experience 
with (successful or failed) innovation alliances, the IP 
protection methods used, the communication level and the 
building and maintenance of trust within the alliance and 
this was related to the perceived innovation performance 
of the alliance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 contains the theoretical background and the conceptual 
model underlying the empirical research carried out for 
the present study. In Section 3 a description of the research 
methods (questionnaire construction, data collection and 
data analysis) is given. In the results Section 4, a PLS model 
that shows the relations between the different constructs 
will be discussed. In Section 5 the conclusions and the 
limitations of the present study are presented and in Section 
6 recommendations for innovation managers are provided.
2. Theoretical framework
Open innovation can be carried out in different governance 
forms, each with different characteristics related to the 
communication channels used for knowledge sharing, 
the incentives used to actuate the innovation partner(s) 
and the types of property rights used (Felin and Zenger, in 
press). One of the governance forms is called partnerships, 
alliances and CVC (corporate venture capital). This type is 
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well suited in case of moderately complex problems that 
need significant knowledge exchange to be solved, while 
the information needed for a solution may be hidden from 
the problem owner (Felin and Zenger, in press). It is this 
type of governance that the present paper will investigate, 
as due to the problem complexity complete IP protection 
arrangements are impossible to achieve and communication 
between the partners is normally rich.
In an innovation alliance, as we will call this governance 
form, the actual (open) innovation is carried out. Here 
different companies with different expertise come together 
to share knowledge and experience, to make use of 
technologies of the other(s) and to create an innovation 
that would not have been feasible for them alone, or at 
least not at that speed, low costs and with that quality. 
However, in an innovation alliance collaborating parties are 
vulnerable. They open themselves up to the partner(s), and 
they share their technologies, knowledge and experience, but 
they do not want the partner(s) to benefit from it outside 
the purposes and boundaries of the innovation alliance 
itself. Furthermore, one can suffer from opportunism from 
the side of the other party, for example if a partner leaves 
the alliance before the results are reached, or does not 
invest in the alliance as agreed upon in advance. Hence, it 
is important to make sure that one can be secure of each 
other within the alliance. This should be guaranteed at the 
inception of the collaboration. Hence this research can 
be placed in the first phase of the model how firms profit 
from external innovations, as proposed by West and Bogers 
(2013), namely the phase of obtaining innovations from 
external sources.
In literature, different means to establish this security within 
collaboration have been discussed. The concepts of control 
(which we will call IP protection) and trust are often key 
in these discussions, while also communication between 
the partners seems to be of special importance. And not 
only may these factors influence each other (e.g. some argue 
that IP arrangements can be a prerequisite for trust), but 
they also may influence the innovation performance of the 
alliance itself, which of course is the ultimate goal of starting 
any innovation alliance, while IP and trust are only means 
towards this goal. To describe these different concepts and 
how they may be expected to influence each other, first 
the concept of trust will be introduced, than the relation 
between trust and IP and the role of prior experience and 
communication will be discussed. Finally concepts will be 
brought together in a framework of the innovation alliance.
Trust can be defined as ‘the mutual confidence that no 
party to an exchange will exploit anothers vulnerabilities’ 
(Sabel, 1993, in Barney and Hansen, 1994: 176). Within the 
concept of trust we can make two important distinctions. 
The first is between psychological and behavioral 
perspectives on trust (Poppo, 2013). From a psychological 
perspective, trust is related to expectations and beliefs, in 
other words: attributes ascribed to the other partner. From 
a behavioral perspective, trust is observed in actual behavior 
and builds through ongoing cooperative interactions. The 
second distinction is between intentional and competence 
trust. Intentional trust is trust in the good intentions of the 
partner(s), especially related to opportunism. Competence 
trust is trust in the technical, cognitive, organizational and 
communicative competences of a partner (Klein Woolthuis 
et al., 2005: 814). The difference is thus between willingness 
and ability of the partner, and both may be difficult to grasp 
before one starts a collaboration.
Trust can be a source of competitive advantage (Barney 
and Hansen, 1994), as trust may substitute for costly 
governance costs to prevent opportunism; and trust may 
open new options for partners in the exchange, because 
these options would not be economically feasible if 
governance costs would have to be made to prevent 
opportunism. Furthermore, one could argue that in case 
of trust one can find new possibilities to cooperate, as one 
does not have to keep information away from the partner 
and new possibilities for synergy may be found. However, 
it is difficult to know if the partner is trustworthy, especially 
as (nearly) every company may fall prey to opportunism if 
the golden opportunity comes by, or if a bankruptcy is close 
(Nooteboom, 2006).
Our main interest lies in the role of prior alliance experience 
and IP protection on building trust. As Poppo (2013) 
shows in her review on interorganizational trust, prior 
experience with a partner (in her words 'the shadow of 
the past' (p.134)) has been shown to build trust. From a 
psychological perspective, this can be explained by trusting 
beliefs becoming stronger over time as these beliefs are 
confirmed. Here the psychological and the behavioral view 
on trust overlap, as these beliefs are confirmed by actual 
behavior in interactions with the partner.
The other important factor related to trust, IP protection, 
can be described as the process by which entrepreneurs 
can retain the uniqueness and value of their technological 
competences (MacEvily et al., 2004: 714), while ‘intellectual 
property, often known as IP, refers to creations of the mind: 
inventions (patents), literary and artistic works, symbols, 
names, images, designs used in commerce’ (EU Copyright 
Office; www.eucopyright.com/en/what-is-intellectual-
property). IP is important, as ‘the owner of intellectual 
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property can control and be rewarded for its use, and this 
encourages further innovation and creativity to the benefit 
of us all’. There is a big debate in literature about the 
relationship between trust and IP protection (or in literature 
terms: control, e.g. Poppo, 2013). Three different relations 
have been proposed (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). The 
first stream, stemming from transaction cost economics, 
regards IP as a basis for trust, as IP arrangements make 
opportunistic behavior more difficult. The second view 
conceptualizes IP in conflict with trust, as the setting up 
of IP arrangements might be regarded as a sign of distrust 
by the partner(s); IP arrangements may then even evoke 
conflict. Hence it is argued that IP negatively influences 
the level of trust. And thirdly, there is the notion that trust 
precedes IP arrangements and thus decreases the need for 
formal arrangements; the relation is embedded in trust.
Empirical evidence has shown that trust and IP can be 
both substitutes and complements to one another (Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). On the one hand, trust can 
substitute for IP as a high level of trust has been found to 
reduce the need for contracts and monitoring (Das and Teng, 
1998). On the other hand, trust and IP can be regarded to 
complement each other, as they are found hand in hand (e.g. 
Luo, 2002) or preceding contractual arrangements (Larson, 
1992). Omta and Van Rossum (1999) found, in their study 
of twelve failed alliances, that distrust (and related: fear) 
were important in seven of these alliances. They even report 
that (in two cases) the IP negotiations between (specifically: 
European and American) partners were made much longer 
and more difficult because the American partners started the 
negotiations with ‘corporate lawyers and fist-sized contracts’ 
(Omta and Van Rossum, 1999: 6). However, the question 
remains how and why IP and trust sometimes complement 
and sometimes substitute each other.
An important distinction in IP protection is between 
formal and non-formal IP (Bönte and Keilbach, 2005). 
Building on Denolf (2010), in Table 1 we provide an 
overview of formal and non-formal IP protection methods. 
Denolf argues that IP protection methods are often used 
complementary to one another. Furthermore, industries 
differ in which IP protection methods they apply most. 
Here, the kind of innovation that one wants to protect is 
important. For process innovation confidentiality and for 
product innovation speed of gaining market share are often 
regarded as the most effective way to protect the innovation. 
Also the size of the company matters. Smaller companies 
tend more to speed, trade secrets and confidentiality and 
larger companies more to formal IP protection methods. It 
can be expected that the IP protection status of a company 
is of influence on the innovation performance of alliances, 
e.g. a company is expected to be more inclined towards 
cooperation with (potential) competitors if the company 
is sure one’s own intellectual property is well protected. It 
may be expected that the experience a company has with 
previous alliances has an influence on future alliances, as 
well. For example, if a company has experienced a failed 
alliance, one may expect that this company will take more 
precautions to prevent a new failure by making more specific 
arrangements about IP and the deliverables.
Communication is also expected to play a role in the alliance, 
both in its performance as well as in the development of 
trust. This could be perceived as an intermediary role: it is not 
the communication itself that increases performance or trust, 
but it is the means through which novel knowledge travels or 
a trustworthy impression may develop. Communication may 
build trust, at least if the partner(s) is/are indeed trustworthy 
(Becerra and Gupta, 2003). Trust starts off with the general 
propensity to trust of the trusting party (the trustor) and 
the impression the trustor has about the party to be trusted 
(the trustee). More communication gives the trustor more 
information about the trustee and whether or not the trustee 
can be trusted, or in terms of Poppo (2013), knowledge-based 
trust is built. And indeed, Becerra and Gupta (2003) find a 
positive relation between the amount of communication 
and the evaluation of trustworthiness. Hence we expect to 
find that communication builds trust within an alliance. 
A different reason to assume a positive relation between 
communication and trust, is that communication offers a 
means for monitoring the arrangements made, or that one 
is less inclined to betray a person with whom one has a 
personal relationship (which is built by frequent contacts, 
Nilsson, 2008). Finally, communication is related to the 




•	 confidentiality, trade secrets
•	 complexity of the product design 
or technology platform
•	 quick standardization, speed of 
gaining market share
•	 use of passwords
•	 limitation of the internal mobility 
of personnel (glass walls)
Formal IP protection •	 patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
design rights
•	 contracts (e.g. collaboration 
agreements)
•	 non-competition clauses in 
contracts of employees
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innovation performance itself. Here it is again useful to turn 
to Granovetter (1973, 1983). He shows, in his theory of the 
strength of weak ties, how communication is important in 
the spread of ideas. Novel information, which much more 
often leads to innovation than familiar ideas do, ranges most 
often from social groups relatively distant from oneself (as 
otherwise, the information would be familiar already). 
Hence, especially the relationships (the ties in a network) 
between people relatively distant and different from one 
another are important. As these people are more different, 
they are more likely to dwell in different social groups and 
hence to have access to different knowledge. Thus, these weak 
ties are thought to be a very valuable source of new ideas 
and thus of innovation.
The above considerations result in the conceptual model 
presented in Figure 1. Within the innovation alliance prior 
experience, IP protection and communication are expected 
to play important roles in building trust. As was argued, 
prior experience can be positively or negatively related 
to IP protection, depending if the company has positive 
or negative experiences in earlier innovation alliances in 
general, or with a specific partner in particular. As argued 
above, IP can also be positively and negatively related to 
trust, and it will therefore be analyzed separately if, and if 
so, why in certain instances the relation is positive, while in 
other instances it is negative. Intensive communication is 
expected to increase trust, and trust, in turn, is expected to 
be positively related to innovation performance.
3. Research methods
A survey questionnaire was combined with semi-structured 
interviews of CEOs and R&D managers of seven companies 
and two commercial research organizations in the seed 
sector, one agrifood company, one commercial research 
organization in the agrifood and one commercial research 
organization in the high-tech sector. The number of 
employees in the Netherlands ranged from 20 to 500 full 
time equivalents (ftes) for the research organizations and 
two of the companies. In the other companies 500 to 1,200 
fte were working. The R&D intensity (R&D fte/total fte) was 
high with a mean of 83.5% (SD: 19.9%) for the research 
organizations and 25.2% (SD: 16.9%) for the companies. 
Data were gathered about 33 innovation alliances: 29 
successful and 4 failed alliances. Nineteen alliances were 
reported by the companies and 14 by the commercial 
research organizations.
The survey questionnaire was based on existing 
questionnaires, developed by Fortuin (2007), Tepić et al. 
(2014), Garbade et al. (2013a,c). Furthermore, questions 
from the annual effect measurement of Food Valley NL 
(Omta and Fortuin, 2013), were used. Questions were 
raised regarding IP arrangements and the intensity of 
communication, the level of trust within the alliance and 
the innovation performance. The interview guide was 
extensively discussed with an expert in the field and tested in 
a pilot interview. The operationalization of the key concepts 
is presented below.
Prior experience was operationalized by asking the 
respondents if they had experienced alliance failure in the 
past. It can be expected that a company that has experienced 
a failed alliance will try to prevent alliance failure in the 
future, e.g. by making more tight IP arrangements. The 
respondents of 17 of the 33 innovation alliances reported 
to have experienced alliance failure.
To measure IP protection, three questions were asked, using 
7-point Likert scales (ranging from 1. not at all to 7. to a 
very large extent) namely:
•	 In this alliance patent and/or technology mapping was 
used.
•	 At the start of the cooperation arrangements were made 
regarding:
 – confidentiality;
 – property rights of outputs and/or results.
The respondents have been asked to indicate the importance 
for the company of each formal and non-formal IP 
protection mechanism as shown in Table 1 using 7-point 
Likert scales (ranging from 1. not at all important to 7. very 
important). Only the respondents of seven companies and 
two commercial research organizations could answer (part 
of) this question, so n is lower than 33 (Table 7).
Communication has been measured by asking the 
respondent how often there has been contact between 
employees of their company and employees of any of 









Figure 1. Conceptual model.
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media: e-mail, face-to-face and telephone. The level of 
communication was measured using a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1. more than once a week to 7. less than 
once a year. Trust was measured using four 7-point Likert 
scale questions (ranging from 1. completely disagree to 7. 
completely agree), namely:
•	 In a new project I certainly want to cooperate with this 
partner again.
•	 We would be willing to do extra investments in this 
alliance, if this might be needed.
•	 In this alliance opportunism appears/appeared to be a 
problem.
•	 This partner always does what he promises.
Innovation performance was measured using two 7-point 
Likert scaled questions (ranging from 1. not at all to 7. 
very much):
•	 In this alliance products were developed that were new 
to the company.
•	 In this alliance new production processes were developed 
that are new to the company, or these have been greatly 
improved.
Data collection started with contacting the respondents, and 
sending them the interview guide in advance. The interviews 
were thoroughly prepared, by reading information from the 
website of the organization, reading annual reports and 
by looking up public data, e.g. in the patent database. The 
interviews took 1 to 1.5 hours; detailed transcripts of the 
interviews were made, and were sent to the respondents 
to be checked. With their remarks the final version of the 
transcript was made.
The quantitative data are based on the 7-point Likert scale 
questions, except for the general data about the company 
(e.g. turnover, employees, number of patents). As it turned 
out that the data were not normally distributed, non-
parametric methods of analysis were used. The data were 
investigated on their general characteristics, using explore 
and descriptive statistics in SPSS. The correlations between 
the formal and non-formal IP protection mechanisms and 
the different trust variables were analyzed using Spearman 
Rank correlation.
The conceptual model was tested by PLS modeling (Garbade, 
2013b) using t-tests of the path coefficients (between the 
latent variables) and the outer loadings (the loadings of 
the constituting variables on the latent variables). The 
significance of the interaction effects uncovered with PLS 
was tested with bootstrapping, a cross-validation method. 
It is a resampling procedure, which yields the same number 
of cases as in the original sample. As the bootstrapping is 
based on trial and error it gives slightly different results 
every time it is used for the same model. The number of 
resamples was chosen to be 5,000, far exceeding the 200 
indicated as minimum.
4. Results
The conceptual model presented in Figure 1 describes the 
relation between prior experience, communication, trust, 
IP arrangements and innovation performance. As discussed 
in Section 3, to test the validity and reliability of the model 
we followed Garbade et al. (2013b). For the Individual item 
reliability again each variable should have a cross-loading 
of at least 0.7 to its latent variable and all indicators should 
have their highest cross loading on the latent variable they 
are connected to.
In Table 2 the cross loadings can be found. It becomes clear 
that every indicator has a cross-loading of minimally 0.83 
to its own variable, and hence the 0.7 criterion has been 
fulfilled. Also there are no indicators with a higher cross 
loading on another latent variable than the one they belong 
to (although for communication – face-to-face the cross 
loading to the latent variable Communication is as high as 
Trust, which may show the special importance of face-to-face 
contact for building trust). The convergent validity of the 
latent variables, the internal consistency, can be measured 
using the composite reliability measure. Hulland (1999) 
proposes a cutoff point: 0.7 is the minimum. As can be 
seen in Table 3, all three latent variables score far above 
this minimum.
The discriminant validity is a measure to see if the different 
latent variables in the model do really differ from one 
another. The square root of the average variance extracted 
(AVE) should be higher than the latent variable correlations. 
Furthermore, the AVE should be 0.5 or higher.
Table 4 shows that the AVEs are far above 0.5. However, 
two correlations (underlined) are equal or higher than the 
SQRT AVE of one of the latent variables they belong to. 
The first is the correlation between Trust and IP, which is 
as high as the SQRT AVE of IP. As both are related in the 
model (IP loads on Trust) a correlation could have been 
expected. However, this correlation should not be higher (or 
here: as high) as the cohesion of the contributing variables 
in the latent variable IP. However, it has not been chosen 
to take the variable with the lowest cross loading in IP (IP 
protection – property rights) out of this construct, as more 
variables loading on a construct is important for the quality 
of the model (as this adds more variance to be explained to 
the model). The second, more problematic, case is the high 
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correlation between IP and Performance. This indicates that 
it might improve the model by connecting IP protection 
to Performance. This was done and it indeed results in a 
significant path coefficient (0.41, t-value=2.21), while also 
the path between Trust and Performance remains significant 
(0.59, t-value=3.38).
The conceptual model has been tested using PLS. The 
t-values have been calculated using a bootstrapping 
procedure of 5,000 samples. All outer loadings are highly 
significant (Table 5 – the lowest value is t=7.98).
Figure 2 shows the PLS test of the conceptual model. It shows 
that significant and positive relationships are found between 
Failed alliance experience and IP protection, between IP 
protection and Trust (although only at alpha = 0.05 for a 
one-sided test), between Communication and Trust and, 
finally, between Trust and Innovation Performance. In the 
Table in the Appendix more precise information is given.
The fit of the PLS model has been evaluated using the R2 
value. Three of the constructs have an R2 value (which 
measures how much of the variance of all contributing 
and latent variables on the variable is). Table 6 shows that 
all correlations are rather strong; IP has the weakest fit 
(R2=0.69), which is still good. Furthermore, most of the 
Table 2. Cross loadings performance model (in black cross loadings of the indicators on the latent variable they are connected 
to; e.g. the latent variable IP arrangements is based upon 3 indicators with cross loadings ranging from 0,83-0,94).
Experience IP arrangements Communication Trust Performance
Prior experience – experience with a failed alliance 1.00 0.83 0.70 0.70 0.73
IP protection – patent/technology mapping 0.60 0.84 0.72 0.72 0.77
IP protection – confidentiality 0.80 0.94 0.87 0.87 0.91
IP protection – property rights 0.75 0.83 0.60 0.69 0.73
Communication – e-mail 0.60 0.74 0.96 0.81 0.77
Communication – face-to-face 0.75 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.97
Communication – phone 0.64 0.75 0.97 0.86 0.81
Trust – cooperate again 0.58 0.70 0.88 0.90 0.78
Trust – extra investments 0.71 0.90 0.87 0.98 0.97
Trust – keeping promises 0.71 0.90 0.87 0.98 0.97
Performance – new products 0.67 0.88 0.81 0.93 0.97
Performance – new processes 0.75 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.97







Table 4. Discriminant validity of the performance model (in gray the latent variable correlations).
Performance Communication Experience IP Trust SQRT AVE AVE
Performance 1.00 0.97 0.95
Communication 0.90 1.00 0.95 0.91
Prior experience 0.73 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00
IP protection 0.92 0.85 0.83 1.00 0.87 0.76
Trust 0.95 0.91 0.70 0.87 1.00 0.96 0.92
SQRT AVE 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.87 0.96
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variance in Performance has been explained, even though 
IP has not been connected to this construct, which shows 
that the model has not suffered too much from leaving 
out this possible linkage. The relation between Trust and 
Performance has been shown in this model. It turns out that 
this relation is strong (path coefficient = 0.95) and highly 
significant (t-value=35.03). Also if a path between IP and 
Performance would be included, still the influence of Trust 
is higher than the contribution of IP. Hence, the importance 
of trust in an innovation alliance should be emphasized.
It has been proposed that the role of Communication 
could be an intermediary one between IP protection and 
trust. If this is modeled (PLS model 2, not shown), the 
path coefficient between IP to Communication becomes 
0.85 (t=14.32), while the path from Communication to 
Trust is 0.294 (t=22.38), with a model fit of R2=0.88. This 
model shows that IP and Communication may indeed be 
related, and that in fact the significance of IP protection in 
the model is increased.
The relations between the trust variables and the formal 
and non-formal IP protection have been investigated. Only 
the respondents of 7 companies and 2 commercial research 
organizations could answer (part of) the questions, so N 
is lower than 33. Because of the central importance of IP 
protection, we decided to analyze the data using Spearman 
Rank correlation with pairwise deletion (Table 7).
A remarkable observation from Table 7 is that there is a very 
significant negative relation between formal and non-formal 
protection mechanisms. Another remarkable observation 
is that the level of non-formal IP protection is significantly 
and positively related to opportunism (more non-formal 
IP protection is related to more opportunism). This may 
imply that non-formal IP protection methods leave room 
for opportunism from the other collaboration partners, e.g. 
by abusing confidentiality arrangements.
5. Conclusions
It was the aim of the present study to improve our insight 
in the role of the interplay of prior experience, IP protection 
Table 5. t-values of the outer loadings.
Sample mean Standard error t statistics
IP protection – patent mapping 0.83 0.08 10.83
IP protection – confidentiality 0.95 0.03 29.95
IP protection – property rights 0.82 0.10 7.98
Communication – e-mail 0.95 0.03 29.15
Communication – face-to-face 0.93 0.04 25.14
Trust – cooperate again 0.90 0.06 15.61
Trust – extra investments 0.98 0.03 38.58
Performance – new products 0.97 0.02 40.92
Performance – new processes 0.97 0.04 27.60











Figure 2. PLS test of the conceptual model.
Table 6. R2-values of performance, intellectual property 





 The role of prior experience, intellectual property protection and communication on trust and performance in innovation alliances
Journal on Chain and Network Science 14 (2014) 125
and communication on trust and on the performance of 
innovation alliances. Three different relations have been 
proposed (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). The first stream, 
stemming from transaction cost economics, regards IP as 
a basis for trust, as IP arrangements make opportunistic 
behavior more difficult. The second view conceptualizes IP 
in conflict with trust, as the setting up of IP arrangements 
might be regarded as a sign of distrust by the partner(s); 
IP arrangements may then even evoke conflict. Hence it 
is argued that IP negatively influences the level of trust. 
And thirdly, there is the notion that trust precedes IP 
arrangements and thus decreases the need for formal 
arrangements; the relation is embedded in trust.
The PLS model presented in Figure 2 shows the positive 
impact of prior experience, IP protection, communication on 
trust and via trust on innovation performance in alliances. 
The positive relationship between prior experience and IP 
protection may indicate that if respondents have experienced 
a failed collaboration, they might be less inclined to trust 
possible partners again, and make more use of IP protection 
in new collaborations. In addition, PLS model 2 shows that 
IP protection and Communication may indeed be related, 
and that this way the significance of IP in the PLS model 
is increased. These results suggest that communication 
might indeed play an intermediary role between IP and 
Trust. From this we conclude, in contrast to the three 
possibilities suggested above, that IP Protection may provide 
the platform for open communication, important to build 
trust in an innovation alliance. A different interpretation, 
however, might be that more IP protection will often be 
related to more intense collaboration, with hence more 
contact, or that the security IP offers may lead to more 
contact, as one is more secure that the partner will not be 
make inappropriate use of the information. This could be 
an interesting topic for further investigation.
Two remarkable observations stem from Table 7. Firstly, non-
formal IP protection is positively related to opportunism. 
This may imply that non-formal IP protection methods 
leave room for opportunism from the other collaboration 
partners, e.g. by abusing confidentiality arrangements, while 
formal IP protection arrangements are positively related to 
the partner keeping promises, which may indicate that, apart 
from the influence trust may have, one's partners are more 
inclined to keep promises if one makes more use of formal 
IP protection mechanisms, maybe because they are more 
afraid to be taken to court. And secondly, there is a very 
significant negative relation between formal and non-formal 
protection mechanisms. This might indicate that these are 
not just different dimensions of an overarching concept, 
but completely distinct. The difference between formal and 
non-formal IP protection and the different influences these 
may have on innovation alliance performance is also an 
interesting topic for further investigation.
Interestingly, distrust has never been mentioned as a reason 
for alliance failure during the interviews, while Omta and 
Van Rossum (1999), who focused on failed alliances, 
discovered that this was the case in 7 out of 12 failed 
alliances. This could be caused by the fact that alliance 
failure is a sensitive issue. However, it could also be that 
there is an important phase before the alliance starts, some 
sort of a non-formal selection procedure in which trust plays 
an important role. Maybe if trust is not found or established 
here, the alliance does not even start. To find out how trust 
is built, this thus may be an important phase to investigate, 
as also Poppo (2013) proposed in her literature review. 
It could even be that this phase of getting to know each 
other and of writing the goals and agreements related to the 
alliance, are essential for building trust. This would mean 
that standard contracts, as some companies we interviewed 
used, may harm the trust building in the alliance, and thus 
its performance. This could explain the positive relation 
between alliance failure and the use of standard contracts 
we found in the few alliances where a failed alliance was 
reported (not presented in the results section).
Table 7. Spearman rank correlation of formal and non-formal intellectual property (IP) protection vs. trust using pairwise 












1.000 -0.498** (30) -0.243 (29) 0.012 (29) 0.685*** (25) 0.049 (25)
Formal IP 
protection
1.000 0.66** (23) 0.254 (23) 0.043 (20) 0.341 (20)
R.J. Ruitenburg, F.T.J.M. Fortuin and S.W.F. Omta
126 Journal on Chain and Network Science 14 (2014)
It is important to be aware of the limitations of the present 
study. As only data of 33 alliances were available there is a 
risk of over-fitting the data. Because of the limited amount of 
data it was also not possible to incorporate other factors that 
could play a role, such as the risk on leakage of confidential 
information and the complementarity between the partners. 
Hence the collection of more data is recommended to gain 
a higher external validity. Also, the measurement of different 
constructs deserves attention. The high latent variable 
correlations may point at the fact that the different latent 
variables have not been measured sufficiently precise, and 
thus do not represent the different concepts, but rather an 
overall satisfaction with the alliance and its performance. 
However, as the model confirms the relationships expected 
based on literature and also explains a number of failed 
alliances, the results of the model can be considered reliable 
taking these limitations into account.
6. Recommendations
The present study shows that for innovation performance 
in innovative alliances, building and maintaining trust 
is of critical importance. Hence it is important to find 
(a) partner(s) one can trust and to feed this trust with 
communication to let it grow even further. To start with 
the selection of partners; it is important not only to select on 
complementarity, but also on trustworthiness. As a manager 
you could ask yourself if you know colleagues or experts that 
you trust, who can give you more information about the 
trustworthiness of your potential partner and the incentives 
and the IP protection measures that may stimulate the 
potential partners to act trustworthy. Furthermore, it is 
important to understand that there is a trade-off between 
familiarity and novelty. Novel partners may offer new 
knowledge, but may be difficult to understand (due to 
the cognitive distance, Nooteboom, 2006). Sometimes 
it may thus be better to choose a partner that is slightly 
less complementary to your company. Related to this, it 
may be important not to have too many partners, as it has 
been reported that especially large alliances with many 
partners suffer from opportunism and cognitive distance. 
With respect to familiarity, also the business culture of the 
partner may be important. Fortuin and Omta (2008), for 
instance, report the differences in dealing with contracts 
and IP between European and US-based companies. In 
addition, as communication is important, distance may be 
of influence, as larger distances can be expected to lead to 
less contact. Especially as face-to-face contact is important; it 
may be advisable to choose partners that are located nearby. 
And if a partner is located at far distance, frequent email, 
skype and phone contact is recommended to be sure that no 
misunderstandings occur. It is also good to note that it may 
be worth the efforts and costs to invest in one's relation with 
a potential partner before the collaboration is formalized. 
This may make the formalization easier, shorter and thus 
cheaper, and may increase the mutual understanding and 
thus also the insights in what arrangements need to be 
made.
When a partner has been chosen, IP arrangements have 
to be set up. The present study showed that making clear 
arrangements is very important for collaborations, not 
only as a legal mechanism, but also because contracts have 
three additional functions: 1. coordination; 2. safeguard 
for contingencies; and 3. as a sign of commitment (Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). It is important to realize that IP 
protection is never a goal in itself, but only a means towards 
building a secure platform on which trust can be build. 
Hence, the setting up of contracts and IP arrangements 
should be used to build trust and to foster communication. 
In this, ample care should be taken to adapt the use of 
IP arrangements to the problem complexity (Felin and 
Zenger, in press). Finally, it is important to understand the 
crucial role of flexibility and creativity in innovation. Only 
by allowing a certain degree of freedom in the alliance, 
high innovative performance can be expected. Hence IP 
protection should not be used to fixate all possible situations 
in advance, but to give direction in how to deal with certain 
contingencies. As one of our respondents stated: ‘the best 
practice in collaboration is to make good arrangements in 
advance, but not to lay down too many things too precisely. 
In this way, one can switch quickly if things change or new 
opportunities occur.’ And on our question how abuse could 
be prevented in such an open relation, he answered: ‘by a 
lot of communication’.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the respondents that 
contributed to the research for the valuable contributions. 
The study received funding from the European Union 
Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) under grant 
agreement no. 245301 NetGrow.
References
Arora, A., A. Fosfuri and A. Gambardella, 2001. Markets for 
technology and their implications for corporate strategy. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(2): 419-451.
Barney, J.B. and M.H. Hansen, 1994, Trustworthiness as a source 
of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 
175-90.
 The role of prior experience, intellectual property protection and communication on trust and performance in innovation alliances
Journal on Chain and Network Science 14 (2014) 127
Becerra, M. and A.K. Gupta, 2003, Perceived trustworthiness within 
the organization: the moderating impact of communication 
frequency on trustor and trustee effects. Organization Science, 
14(1): 32-44.
Bönte, W. and M. Keilbach, 2005. Concubinage or marriage? Non-
formal and formal cooperations for innovation. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(3-4): 279-302.
Chesbrough, H., and R.S. Rosenbloom, 2002. The role of the 
business model in capturing value from innovation: evidence 
from Xerox Corporations technology spin-off companies. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(3): 529-555.
Chesbrough, H.W., 2003. Open innovation: the new imperative for 
creating and profiting from technology. Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, MA, USA.
Das, T.K. and B. Teng, 1998. Between trust and control: developing 
confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of 
Management Review, 23(3): 491-512.
Denolf, J., 2010. De rol van beschermbaarheid voor groei van 
hoogtechnologische starters, Master thesis University of Ghent, 
Belgium.
Enkel, E., O. Gassmann and H. Chesbrough, 2009. Open R&D and 
open innovation: exploring the phenomenon. R&D Management, 
39(4): 311-316.
Felin, T. and T.R. Zenger, in press. Closed or open innovation? 
Problem solving and the governance choice. Research Policy, in 
press: doi 10.1016/j.respol.2013.09.006.
Fortuin, F., 2007. Strategic alignment of innovation to business. 
Innovation and sustainability series, no. 2. Wageningen Academic 
Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands, 176 pp.
Garbade, P.J.P., F.T.J.M. Fortuin and S.W.F. Omta, 2013a. 
Coordinating clusters: a cross sectoral study of cluster 
organization functions in The Netherlands. International Journal 
on Food System Dynamics, 33: 243-257.
Garbade, P.J.P., F.T.J.M. Fortuin and S.W.F. Omta, 2013b. Exploring 
the characteristics of innovation alliances of Dutch biotechnology 
SMEs and their policy implications. Bio-based and Applied 
Economics, 21: 91-111.
Garbade, P.J.P., S.W.F. Omta, F.T.J.M. Fortuin, R. Hall and G. 
Leone, 2013c. The impact of the product generation life cycle on 
knowledge valorization at the public private research partnership, 
the Centre for BioSystems Genomics. NJAS Wageningen Journal 
of life sciences, 67: 1-10.
Granovetter, M., 1973. The strength of weak ties. The American 
Journal of Sociology, 78(6): 21.
Granovetter, M., 1983. The strength of weak ties: a network theory 
revisited. Sociological Theory, 1: 201-233.
Hulland, J.S., 1999. Use of partial least squares PLS in strategic 
management research: a review of four recent studies. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20: 195-204.
Klein Woolthuis, R., B. Hillebrand and B. Nooteboom, 2005. Trust, 
contract and relationship development. Organization Studies, 
26(6): 813-840.
Larson, A., 1992. Network dyads in entrepreneurial setting – a study 
of the governance of exchange relationships. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 37(1): 76-104.
Luo, Y., 2002. Contract, cooperation, and performance in 
international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 23: 
903-919.
MacEvily, S.K., K.M. Eisenhardt and J.E. Prescott, 2004. The 
global acquisition, leverage, and protection of technological 
competencies. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8-9): 713-22.
Narula, R. and J. Hagedoorn, 1999. Innovating through strategic 
alliances: moving towards international partnerships and 
contractual agreements. Technovation, 19(5): 283-294.
Nicholls-Nixon, C.L. and C.Y. Woo, 2003. Technology sourcing 
and output of established firms in a regime of encompassing 
technological change. Strategic Management Journal, 24(7): 
651-666.
Nilsson, M., 2008. A tale of two networks: sharing resources to 
compete Lund studies in economics and management: Lund 
Business Press, Lund, Sweden.
Nooteboom, B., 2006. Trust and innovation. Tilburg University, 
Tilburg, the Netherlands, 12 pp.
OECD and EUROSTAT, 2005. Oslo manual – guidelines for 
collecting and interpreting innovation data: the measurement of 
scientific and technological activities, 3rd ed. OECD Publishing, 
Paris, France, 162 pp.
Omta, S.W.F. and F.T.J.M. Fortuin, 2013. The effectiveness of 
cluster organizations in facilitating open innovation in regional 
innovation systems. The case of Food Valley in the Netherlands. 
In: Garcia, M. (ed.) Open Innovation in the Food and Beverage 
industry. Woodhead Publishers Ltd., Cambridge, UK, pp. 174-
188.
Omta, S.W.F. and W. van Rossum, 1999. The management of social 
capital in R&D collaborations. In: Leenders, R.Th.A.J. and S.M. 
Gabbay (eds.) Corporate social capital and liability. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, USA, pp. 356-376.
Ozmel, U., J.J. Reuer, D. Yavuz and T. Zenger, 2013. Alliance 
contracts: bargaining power, network effects and value 
appropriation in alliances. Academy of Management Proceedings, 
2013:13337.
Peck, M.J., 1986. Joint R&D: The case of microelectronics and 
computer technology corporation. Research Policy, 15(5): 219-
231.
Poppo, L., 2013, Origins of inter-organizational trust: a review 
and query for future research. In: Bachman, R. and A. Zaheer 
(eds.) Handbook of advances in trust research. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 336 pp.
Tepić, M., J.H. Trienekens, S.W.F. Omta and F.T.J.M. Fortuin, 2014. 
Governance in different types of sustainability-oriented co-
innovation partnerships in the Dutch agri-food sector. In: Das, 
T.K. (ed.) Managing public-private strategic alliances. Information 
Age Publishing, Charlotte, NC, USA, pp. 189-225.
R.J. Ruitenburg, F.T.J.M. Fortuin and S.W.F. Omta
128 Journal on Chain and Network Science 14 (2014)
West, J. and M. Bogers, 2013. Leveraging external sources of 
innovation: a review of research on open innovation. Journal 
of Product Innovation Management, 31(4): 1-18.
Zott, C., R. Amit and L. Massa, 2011. The business model: recent 
developments and future research. Journal of Management, 
37(4): 1019-1042.
Burgelman, R.A. and R.S. Rosenbloom, 1997. Design and 
Implementation of technology strategy: an evolutionary 
perspective. Division of Research, Harvard Business School, 
Boston, MA, USA.
Sabel, C.F., 1993. Studied trust: building new forms of cooperation 
in a volatile economy. Human relations, 46(9): 1133-1170.
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. and S.W.F. Omta, 2008. The dark side of open 
innovation: a survey of failed inter-company cooperation. 
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Management 
in AgriFood Chains and Networks, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Appendix 1. t-values of the path coefficients of the PLS model.
 Sample mean Standard error t-statistics
Prior experience -> IP protection 0.82 0.12 7.00
IP protection -> Trust 0.39 0.19 1.91
Communication -> Trust 0.58 0.22 2.66
Trust -> Performance 0.95 0.03 35.03
